AOPA Turbine Pilot Magazine - December 2012 - 65

the selector handle. The handle and valve were joined by steel and aluminum tubing, connected by a universal joint.” There were no placards on the selector to indicate position. The NTSB continues, “The fuel quantity is determined by viewing non-linear sight [level] gauges located in the rear cockpit at the wing roots. The sight gauges show an amount of actual fuel supporting a red float. Post-accident examination of the airplane disclosed that the sight gauges were not marked or calibrated for quantity.” The airframe and engine had about 850 total flight hours and the last FAA-required, 12-month condition inspection had taken place September 20, 1997.
ANALYSIS

with nearly catastrophic consequences because of the selector and sight gauge locations.” The check pilot said he never attempted to reposition the fuel selector in flight. An NTSB investigator noted that when he attempted the procedure, he naturally tended to push against the right rudder. A representative from Scaled Composites noted that the rudder is especially effective in inducing yaw and only a 1/8-inch displacement of the side stick would induce roll with a very strong tendency to spiral.
PROBABLE CAUSE

The Long EZ was sold by the builder to a buyer in March 1994, who subsequently sold the aircraft to Denver on September 27, 1997. The aircraft was repainted in Santa Ynez, California, and flown to Santa Maria, where the checkout took place. Denver then flew the airplane to Monterey. The maintenance technician in Monterey said he and Denver had discussed the poor location of the cockpit fuel selector valve handle and that it was very hard to turn. The report notes, “They attempted to extend the reach of the handle, using a pair of vice grip pliers. But this did not solve the problem, as the pilot still could not reach the handle while seated. The pilot said he would use the autopilot in flight, if necessary, to hold the airplane level while he turned the fuel selector valve.” The technician provided him with an inspection mirror, which was recovered from the wreckage, to view the fuel sight gauges on the rear bulkhead. Arrangements had been made to relocate the fuel selector while Denver was away on tour in the near future. Fuel starvation appears to have been the reason why the engine stopped. The Long-EZ had an estimated 19 gallons on board when it departed Santa Maria. According to the check pilot, the fuel selector was positioned to the right tank with about 12.5 gallons. The NTSB estimated the trip to Monterey would burn between 6.4 and 9.1 gallons, depending on power setting, and the accident flight consumed between three and four gallons. That’s a high probability that the right tank was empty at a most inconvenient time and altitude. Scaled Composites flew the same profile in a similar Long-EZ and after running one tank dry, it took six to eight seconds to restart. It was likely that the test pilot was expecting the failure, responded almost immediately, and that the fuel selector handle could be properly repositioned quickly. The NTSB reported, “other pilots who…had flown [the accident airplane], to change the fuel selector a pilot had to: 1) Remove his hand from the right side control stick if he was hand-flying the aircraft; 2) Release the shoulder harness; 3) Turn his upper body 90 degrees to the left to reach the handle; and 4) Turn the handle to another position. Two pilots shared their experiences of having inadvertently run a fuel tank dry

The NTSB determines the probable causes of this accident to be: “the pilot’s diversion of attention from the operation of the airplane and his inadvertent application of right rudder that resulted in the loss of airplane control while attempting to manipulate the fuel selector handle.” Also, the board determined that the pilot’s inadequate preflight planning and preparation, specifically his failure to refuel the airplane, was causal. The board determined that the builder’s decision to locate the unmarked fuel selector handle in a hard-to-access position, unmarked fuel-quantity sight gauges, inadequate transition training by the pilot, and the pilot’s lack of experience in this type of airplane were factors in the accident.
COMMENTARY

This accident indicates how multiple factors can conspire to create a tragedy, but the good news is that it only takes one preventive action to break the accident chain. Personally, several actions are recommended because I’m never quite sure where the final link might be lurking. Fuel is essential to powered flight. If the aircraft has multiple tanks, it doesn’t matter how much fuel is in the tank not connected to the engine. The builder presumably wanted to make his aircraft safer by not having fuel lines in the cockpit and thus relocated the fuel valve. Two problems emerged: The valve was not safely accessible in flight, and the valve itself apparently was not easy to turn because of construction/installation issues. Placards are essential for all controls, and nonlinear fuel gauges must be calibrated and placarded lest they mislead the unwary. Thorough transition training is essential in all aircraft, even for highly experienced pilots. Far too many mishaps occur because the pilot is not one with the machine. The FAA, NTSB, the industry, type clubs, insurance companies, and the Air Safety Institute all strongly recommend it. History proves it. The nature of Experimental aircraft is precisely that. Some modifications work really well and a few leave one to wonder why. Many Experimental aircraft are well designed and well built. Both attributes are essential for safe flight, as is pilot familiarity with the aircraft and its systems. AOPA
BRUCE LANDSBERG is president of the AOPA Foundation.

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AOPA Turbine Pilot Magazine - December 2012

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