IEEE Technology and Society Magazine - December 2021 - 74

Soft Law Governance of Artificial Intelligence
five to ten years. A potential exception here may come
from military applications of AI, which could quickly
rise to international political prominence should a
conflict involving autonomous weapons occur or be
threatened. Existing humanitarian law may already
capture autonomous weaponry, potentially enabling
a faster crystallization of hard legal interventions in
this domain [9].
Anticipating a system of global AI governance
defined by primarily softer legal interventions in the
short-to-medium term has significant implications for
policy analysis and research over this period. The
likelihood of standard-setting and multistakeholder
institutions as predominant sites of early global AI
governance should prompt analysts to identify and
closely evaluate the values and interests of particular
" global governors " that may arise from this regime
[45]. This is especially true for those bodies driven
by a pay-to-play model which have the potential to
unfairly disadvantage certain jurisdictions. Technical
assessments of multistakeholder models and transnational
standards must be qualified by examinations
of the specific institutions which actually perform
global governance functions for AI. While offering
great theoretical potential by blending private expertise
and public interest, each individual institution
has particular constellations of values and constituencies
that should receive critical attention as they
act as conduits for determining and dispersing AI regulatory
norms around the world. Future research and
policy efforts should assess the dynamics within and
around specific institutions, including their inclusiveness
and the voices they represent-or exclude-as
they conduct governance activities in real time.
Similarly, the potential legitimacy, transparency,
and accountability issues that can accompany multistakeholder
and standard-setting bodies wielding
or coordinating soft law should be empirically evaluated
in the particular contexts that appear as value
conflicts inevitably arise over AI. As specific standard-setting
or multistakeholder institutions make
decisions to resolve these value conflicts, attention
should be drawn to the underlying structures, values,
and interests that may impact their role and
preferences in advancing global governance for AI.
Special attention may be required around the transparency
of decision-making bodies and the actual
potential of interested public and nonstate actors to
participate in decision-making [32].
thEsE calls for future analysis should not discount
the real potential of standard-setting and
multistakeholder bodies applying softer legal norms
to bring about an effective framework for AI governance.
Yet, as the world enters this first phase of
global AI governance over the next five to ten years,
it will become ever more critical to ensure that the
institutions and instruments deployed actually do
promote human dignity, wellbeing, and privacy, as
AI continues to have real impacts around the world.

Acknowledgment
The research and writing of this article was supported
by a grant to the Center for Law, Science &
Innovation from the Charles Koch Foundation. The
funder had no role in study design, data collection
and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of
the manuscript. The views in this article are those of
the individual authors, and not necessarily the sponsor
or organizer of this project.
 References
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