IEEE Electrification Magazine - March 2014 - 44

participate with large-scale projects;
there was an automatic decrease of
rates going forward; there would be a
Installierte Leistung
review every four years to revise rates
< 3 MW
3-10 MW
depending upon technological
10-30 MW
improvements; and additional costs
> 30 MW
SH
of the program were to be spread
across all utilities. the last remaining
Hamburg
MV
obstacle disappeared when the european court of Justice ruled that feedin tariffs did not constitute state aid.
NI
During the first decade of the 21st
Berlin
century, germany embarked upon a
BB
massive technological effort to ramp
ST
up its manufacturing capacity for
solar and wind while simultaneously
striving to drive down costs. germany
SN
became a global leader in both techNW
HE
nologies. in the northern parts of
germany with high wind power
TH
resources, some communities own all
RP
or a part of the wind turbines. some of
the areas where rooftop solar is combined with local wind power have
become net energy exporters.
SL
the key to germany's success
was not merely its engineering and
manufacturing prowess but also its
BY
BW
financial acumen. the national feedin-tariff that was instituted drove
München
the ramp up of installations at a
phenomenal pace while also reducing costs. the success of the german
0
100 km
feed-in-tariff model continues to be
an energy policy that other countries
Figure 3. The high penetration of renewables-German wind farms. (Image courtesy of the
have tried to emulate.
German Wind Power Association.)
in 2010, the german government
published their plan for the Energiewende, which means energy transition (table 1). the enerparliamentary maneuvers, and bureaucratic obstacles, but
the renewable energy program slowly took hold and began
gy transition program directed the country away from
to grow because of continued efforts of the burgeoning
nuclear and coal to renewables over a 40-year schedule.
renewable energy industry and grassroots campaigns by
on 11 march 2011, the fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster
citizens. over the years, the economic growth benefits and
occurred in the wake of the tsunami created by the
the emerging export market convinced more people to
tohoku earthquake. this was the largest nuclear disaster
support the program.
in history since chernobyl. three months later, in June
in 1998, after 16 years out of office, a coalition govern2011, the german Parliament, in an almost unanimous
ment of the green Party and social Democrats took over
vote of ruling and opposition parties, confirmed germaand set new goals for the percentage of renewable energy in
ny's long-range energy transition to renewables.
electricity production: 12.5% by 2010 and 50% by 2050. they
Technical Challenges of Integrating
passed the 100,000-roof program that offered low-interest
High-Penetration Renewables
loans for photovoltaic (PV) development. they then worked
the tremendous growth of renewable energy in germany
to reform the original 1990 feed-in law through the erneuerbrought with it many challenges, especially technical issues
bare energie gesetz of 2000. reforms included: rates were
fixed for 20 years (which increased investor confidence);
over grid stability, price volatility in wholesale electricity
rates were different for various sources, size, and location;
markets, and disruptions of the business model of investorrates increased (especially for solar); utilities were eligible to
owned utility (iou) companies.
Verteilung von Windkraftanlagen
in Deutschland (2007)

I E E E E l e c t r i f i c ati o n M agaz ine / MARCH 2014

Table of Contents for the Digital Edition of IEEE Electrification Magazine - March 2014